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Abstract
Health insurances curb price insensitive behavior and moral hazard of in-
sureds through dierent types of cost-sharing, such as tiered co-payments or
reference pricing. This paper evaluates the eect of newly introduced price lim-
its below which drugs are exempt from co-payments on the pricing strategies
of drug manufacturers in reference price markets. We exploit quarterly data
on all prescription drugs under reference pricing available in Germany from
2007 to 2010. To identify causal eects, we use instruments that proxy reg-
ulation intensity. A dierenceindierences approach exploits the fact that
the exemption policy was introduced successively during this period. Our main
results rst show that the new policy led generic rms to decrease prices by 5
percent on average, while brand-name rms increase prices by 7 percent after
the introduction. Second, sales increased for exempt products. Third, we nd
evidence that dierentiated health insurance coverage (public versus private)
explains the identied market segmentation.
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1 Introduction
In markets with insurance coverage, consumers are not directly exposed to the full
price of their consumption. In order to reduce ex-post moral hazard and to steer
consumption to preferred products or services public policymakers and health plans
implement cost-sharing, exploiting consumers' price sensitivity (Berndt, McGuire,
and Newhouse, 2011). For example, as a response to rising pharmaceutical expendi-
tures health insurances have implemented reference pricing and tiered co-payments.
Standard micro-theory predicts that in markets with price-insensitive patients rms
have fewer incentives to compete in prices. This paper investigates manufacturers'
pricing strategies and changes in demand when the co-payment design of a nationwide
public health insurance changes over time. In particular, we analyze the introduc-
tion of a policy that exempts products from co-payments if rms decrease their prices
below a certain threshold: the co-payment exemption level (CEL). Since 2006, the
German public health insurance may exempt drugs from all co-payments if rms set
prices 30 percent or more below the reference price. The policy can be interpreted
as the introduction of tiered co-payments in reference price drug markets where the
placement on the lowest tier depends on the drug's price and not on its type. Typi-
cally, health plans tier co-payments depending on the drug characteristics: generic,
brand-name or not-preferred (Huskamp, Frank, McGuigan, and Zhang, 2005).1 In
recent years managed care plans with tiered coinsurance rates have been on the rise
(Baicker and Goldman, 2011) and also most Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Plans
dierentiate co-payments by drug type (Hoadley, Summer, Hargrave, Cubanski, and
Neuman, 2012). From a rm's perspective, the policy aims at reducing (perceived)
product dierentiation. However, Huskamp, Frank, McGuigan, and Zhang (2005)
show that rms' incentives to compete in prices are low once they are assigned to
a specic tier. How price dependent co-payment exemptions aect rms' pricing
strategies and patients' utilization is an empirical question. In contrast to previ-
ous studies, we provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of the eects of reduced
cost-sharing on supply and on demand.
Our research is guided by three questions: First, we identify the causal eect of the
co-payment exemption levels of low-priced drugs on rms' pricing strategies. Second,
we explore changes in the utilization of exempt vs non-exempt drugs. The analysis
1Berndt and Newhouse (2012) give a comprehensive overview on pricing and reimbursement in
pharmaceutical markets.
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for one indication gives insights into the insureds' price sensitivity and the policy's
eectiveness in steering demand to cost-ecient drugs. Third, we show that hetero-
geneous insurance coverage is a driver of observed pricing strategies. In particular,
we investigate the spillover eects of the policy on privately insured patients whose
out-of-pocket costs are not directly aected by the cost-sharing regulations of the
public health insurance.
Throughout, we dierentiate between generic and brand-name drugs and take into
account the general cost-sharing regulation of the public health insurance, the refer-
ence price system.
First, to identify the causal eects of co-payment exemption levels (CEL) on drug
prices we implement a dierence-in-dierences approach and exploit the sequential
and partial introduction of the CEL over time. Between April 2007 and October
2010, the policy was exogenously introduced in over 200 of the more than 350 thera-
peutic markets. To account for the existing cost-sharing regulation and its potential
endogeneity, we use instruments for reference prices, which capture regulation inten-
sity. We observe product-level data on all reference price drugs marketed in Germany
between 2007 and 2010 (around 70 percent of all drugs). We nd an average price
decrease of 5 percent for generics while prices of brand-name drugs increase by 7
percent due to the policy. Prices of imports do not signicantly change. The results
are robust to alternative estimation strategies and several renements. Thus, we nd
heterogeneous treatment eects and market segmentation.
Second, it is crucial to understand how demand-side instruments steer drug demand
toward cost-ecient products. For example, the increasing utilization due to cost-
sharing is expected to generate greater price discounts by manufacturers (Pavcnik,
2002). Using additional data from IMS Health, we analyze the policy's eect on
sales in the anti-epileptic drug market. The results show that rms gain around
12 percent in sales when decreasing prices below the CEL. In contrast, substantial
losses in market shares and quantities occur when the co-payment exemption policy
applies but prices are not decreased below the exemption threshold. With xed-fee
co-payments insureds have a very limited incentive to search for or switch to lower-
priced substitutes in the same tier (with the same co-payment). Patients face no in-
cremental costs from higher prices, while manufacturers gain market shares through
patients' insurance coverage and through patent protection (Frank and Newhouse,
2008). Huskamp, Frank, McGuigan, and Zhang (2005) nd that tiered co-payments
aect utilization and patients consume more drugs from lower tiers. However, some
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authors nd relatively low price elasticities for prescription drugs for patients whose
benet plans changed from a two-tier to a three-tier co-payment design in the US
(Landsman, Yu, X.Liu, Teutsch, and Berger, 2005; Dalton, 2014). From the patient's
perspective, we analyze a drop in co-payments to zero. We therefore also comple-
ment previous literature on utilization which analyzes the eect of co-payment drops
for high-spending individuals reaching their co-payment limits (Einav, Finkelstein,
and Schrimpf, 2015; Gern, Kaiser, and Schmid, 2015) or for managed-care plans
increasing co-payments from zero to some cost-sharing (Boes and Gern, 2015).
Third, we investigate the hypothesis that heterogeneous insurance coverage drives
the rms' pricing strategies (Ferrara and Kong, 2008; Ferrara and Missios, 2012). In
theory, the role of insurances on pricing strategies was rst emphasized by Hellerstein
(1998). Ferrara and Missios (2012) show that endogenous market segmentation based
on heterogeneous insurance coverage can lead to a price increase of brand-name drugs.
The analyzed cost-sharing policy was introduced for members of the statutory health
insurance (90 percent of the population). However, the list prices also apply to
members of private health plans. That is why we use another data set from IMS
Health on anti-epileptics and compare the evolution of the payers' market shares of
brand-name drugs in markets with and without exemption levels. Since the private
payers share has increased in those markets in which the new policy was introduced
for publicly insureds, we provide initial empirical evidence of market segmentation
due to heterogeneous health insurance coverage.
Basic oligopolistic market models suggest that prices decrease due to more com-
petition. Empirically, an unambiguous eect is found for generics (Wiggins and
Maness, 2004; Reien and Ward, 2005) while the eect on brand-name prices is less
clear. Looking at generic entry, several empirical studies nd evidence of the generic
competition paradox, which subsumes price increases of brand-name products after
generic entry (Scherer, 1993; Regan, 2008; Frank and Salkever, 1997; Grabowski and
Kyle, 2007; Bhattacharya and Vogt, 2003). Since we identify similar heterogeneous
treatment eects we refer to our results on pricing as the co-payment exemption
paradox.
Finally, the new co-payment exemption policy supplements the long-time existing
German reference pricing scheme. In reference price markets, a maximum reim-
bursement is set based on the distribution of the past prices of all competing drugs.
Patients pay all costs above the reference price and are therefore incentivized to
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choose products below the average price of competitors.2 In our model we control
for changes in the reference price, applying a linear instrumental variables approach.
We nd that reference prices have a positive impact on prices, which indicates that
they are an eective cost-control in pharmaceutical markets. Reference prices induce
price competition since drugs are dened to be substitutable within the same thera-
peutic market, which has a similar eect as tiered co-payments, decreasing product
dierentiation. The empirical literature on the eectiveness of (internal) reference
pricing regularly shows that prices decrease after it has been established (Brekke,
Grasdal, and Holmas, 2009; Brekke, Holmas, and Straume, 2011; Kaiser, Mendez,
Rønde, and Ullrich, 2014; Pavcnik, 2002) or reference prices have been adjusted
downwards (Augurzky, Goehlmann, Gress, and Wasem, 2009; Herr, Stuehmeier, and
Wenzel, 2015). Our research is close to Pavcnik (2002) who analyzes the introduction
of reference pricing in selected therapeutic markets in Germany. We improve on her
ndings due to our identication strategy and extend her work by evaluating the
new exemption policy.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We briey explain the German
market for pharmaceuticals and its regulatory framework in section 2. In section
3 we discuss our data. The estimation strategy, and the identication of our key
parameters are presented in section 4. Section 5 presents our results. Section 5.1
presents the eects of the co-payment exemption levels on rms' pricing strategies
and robustness checks for our identication strategy. Section 5.2 and section 5.3
present changes in utilization and the spillover eects on the private health insurance.
Section 6 discusses our ndings and concludes.
2 The German market for pharmaceuticals
Health insurance is mandatory in Germany, about 70m inhabitants (or 87 percent of
the population) were insured by the public health insurance in 2010.3 A share of 11
percent of the population are covered by private health insurances where entry hinges
on job type (self-employed or civil servant) or on high income. Public insurance cost-
2In the following, we use the notion reference pricing for internal reference pricing as opposed
to external reference pricing, where reimbursement limits are set comparative to prices in other
countries.
3The statutory insurance provides universal coverage for most outpatient and inpatient services
and pharmaceuticals. Several plans are oered, but dierences in plan characteristics are minor
and are not relevant for prescription drug markets.
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sharing schemes do not apply to private health plans. However, drugs' list prices are
the same for private and publicly insured.
The German pharmaceutical market is characterized by homogeneous market condi-
tions (Pavcnik, 2002; Ziebarth, 2010). Drug prices are uniform across all pharmacies
and the same co-payment scheme applies to all publicly insured. Incentives to hand
out more expensive drugs are low due to regulated wholesale and pharmacy margins.
Pharmacists receive payments reimbursed directly from the health insurance, namely
a xed fee per package plus a fraction of the drug's price (3 percent). The pharmacy
hands out the drug specied on the prescription or is required by regulation to oer
one of the three cheapest products with the same active ingredient, package size,
and dosage form. If rms oer rebates to health insurances, for example through
a rebate contract with a preferred supplier, pharmacists have to hand out the dis-
counted product, if available. Patients are free to choose one of the drugs oered or
another drug (probably with higher out-of-pocket costs) with the same molecule and
package size as indicated on the prescription.
Physicians may subscribe all approved drugs and have incentives to prescribe cost-
ecient medication due to budget controls of the public insurance. We rely on the
standard model of physician decision-making where patients' out-of-pocket costs en-
ter through the physician's concern for the patient's health assuming perfect agency
(McGuire, 2000; Iizuka and Jin, 2007). In the German health care market, the vast
majority of patients face the same cost-sharing structure, which makes it easy for
physicians to acquire information about patients out-of-pocket costs, e.g., formularies
(Wang and Pauly, 2005; Epstein and Ketcham, 2014).
Co-payments in Germany are dened as 10 percent of the pharmacy's selling price
with a minimum of e5 and a maximum of e10.4 Patients aged under 18 and low-
income insureds with catastrophic health care costs do not need to co-pay.
In 1989, Germany was the rst country to introduce internal reference pricing with
the aim to lower pharmaceutical expenses. While in Germany the reference price
reects some average price within the therapeutic market, in other countries, for
example in Denmark, the reference price is set at the lowest price. In particular,
the reference price is set by the Federal Association of Statutory Health Insurances
(FASHI or the health insurances) such that it does not exceed the 30th percentile
4Although the notion co-payments usually describes a xed amount paid by the insured and
co-insurance would describe the relative cost-sharing (with xed upper and lower bounds) in the
German drug market correctly, we stick to the former notion.
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of the previous year's prices within the dened therapeutic market. The therapeutic
market is dened by the self-administered Federal Joint Committee (GBA) repre-
senting health insurances, hospitals, and doctors. A therapeutic market comprises
drugs that treat the same disease, which might include not only generics but also
several molecules, if considered substitutable, with the same form of administration
(pills or capsules versus injections, for example) while in Norway each molecule de-
nes one market. In the US, several insurances and governmental agencies also dene
a maximum reimbursement based on a list of generic equivalents. For example, the
maximum allowable costs (MAC) are similar to reference pricing in that patients bear
the full costs of drug prices above the MAC (Scott Morton and Kyle, 2012). The
average sales price calculated by Medicare follows a similar approach. Furthermore,
at least 20 percent of all packages and of all prescriptions must be available for prices
equal to or below the reference price at the time of implementation. Products with a
market share of less than 1 percent are not considered in the calculation. The health
insurances are supposed to review and adjust reference prices every year. However,
in our data, reference prices are adjusted every 20 months on average. The number
of adjustments per therapeutic market over the observed 16 quarters varies between
zero (2,483) and two (478) with most of the packages treated once (14,764). These
numbers indicate a heterogeneous timing in regulation.
Pharmaceutical companies cannot negotiate either the assignment to a specic ther-
apeutic market or the reference price itself. The whole procedure is exogenous to
the producers, as is the timing of reference price adjustments. The driving rationale
for adjustments is the entry of new packages in the respective markets. Firms are
always free to change their list prices, which are not negotiated.
Co-payment exemption levels (CEL) dene a price threshold below which patients do
not co-pay for drugs. Co-payment exemption levels have been introduced successively
to several but not all therapeutic markets of reference priced drugs since July 2006.
After the introduction of the CEL, rms may decide to decrease prices below that
level, which lies at 30 percent below the respective reference price, to exempt patients
from co-payments. The new policy is similar to the introduction of a tiered co-
payment system.
By law, the selection of markets that have a CEL should be based on expectations to
generate savings by the new policy. According to personal discussions with managers
of the FASHI the decision vaguely depends on assumptions about patients' substi-
tution behavior and unspecied characteristics of the therapeutic market. We test
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for selection bias and show that there is no evidence of any selection criteria in the
next section, i.e., the empirical investigation fails to identify drivers of the decision
to introduce CEL into specic markets.
3 Data
The sample includes all drugs for which reimbursement is dened by a reference price.
These are potential candidates for a co-payment exemption. For 2010, our data cov-
ers 71.7 percent of all drug packages sold and 36.6 percent of all pharmaceutical
expenses in Germany (Schwabe, Ulrich and Parath, 2011). We keep prescription
drugs only (dropping 13.4 percent of the observations). Reference prices and co-
payment exemption levels are set by the public health insurances using detailed drug
information from Lauer-Taxe, a private marketing rm listing all pharmacy selling
prices and their components.5 Table 1 presents the timing of the treatment since
2007. Co-payment exemption levels are introduced in 241 therapeutic markets be-
tween June 2007 and October 2010. The number of treated products varies between
46 and 728 per quarter.
Table 1: Introduction of co-payment exemption levels (CEL)
Q3 Q5 Q7 Q9 Q14 Q16
# Therapeutic Markets with new CEL 34 8 11 2 41 145
# Drugs with new CEL 728 278 142 46 255 634
Notes: Data from Q3 (JuneSept. 2007) to Q16 (Oct.Dec. 2010). Quarters with few treated
markets and products are not reported. Data source: FASHI. Own calculations.
Prices (p), reference prices (rp), and exemption levels (CEL) are given at the level of
pharmacy selling prices, including VAT and pharmacists' reimbursements (both re-
main unchanged over the study period). Products are characterized by a unique iden-
tication number (PZN), which dierentiates packages by active ingredient, package
size, strength, form of administration, and therapeutic market.
Prices dier for products before and after the treatment. Table 2 presents descriptive
statistics of the treatment group (excluding the control group treated in quarter
5The data on prices and reference prices are published quarterly on the website of the German
Institute for Medical Documentation and Information (DIMDI, 2011). Product-specic co-payment
exemption levels are published on the website of the Federal Association of Statutory Health Insur-
ance Funds (FASHI) (FASHI, 2011) and merged by product id to the above data.
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16) by product types before and after the treatment. From here on, we distinguish
between generic drugs, branded drugs, and imports. Importers are mainly marketing
on-patent drugs and their prices depend on domestic and foreign brand-name drug
prices (Ganslandt and Maskus, 2004; Duso, Herr, and Suppliet, 2014). The 364
companies are classied according to their websites.6
The summary statistics show that the majority of drugs are generics and that brand-
name drugs have higher prices, compared to generics. Drug prices are lower, on
average, with a CEL. The average number of rms per market also decreases. Fiercer
competition might drive rms out of the market.
Table 2: Summary statistics of the treatment group
N Price Ref. price # rms
CEL Before After Before After Before After Before After
Generics 3,433 9,849 39.67 22.56 52.78 25.83 5.58 5.00
(57.92) (28.23) (74.74) (31.22) (1.28) (2.26)
Brand 797 2,164 75.21 44.06 79.48 36.28 5.76 4.73
(106.8) (63.08) (117.1) (59.23) (2.00) (1.31)
Importer 775 1,811 39.38 35.32 41.79 31.85 2.39 1.20
(31.13) (28.97) (36.02) (32.22) (1.15) (.42)
Notes: Data of the treatment group from Q1 (Jan.March 2007) to Q15 (JuneSept.
2010). Means and standard deviations (in parentheses), by rm class before/after the
introduction of co-payment exemption levels (CEL). Average # of rms per therapeutic
market. Prices and reference prices are ination adjusted to the base year 2007. Data
source: FASHI. Own calculations.
The descriptive results indicate various pricing strategies of brand-name and generic
rms. Since reference prices are an important benchmark for a rm's price setting
(and for the co-payments), we investigate the pricing patterns relative to reference
prices in Table 3. 97 percent of generic rms and around 90 percent of brand-name
rms and importers set prices below the reference price before a CEL is introduced.
While the share is stable for generic drugs with a CEL, about 25 percent of the brand-
name drugs' prices and 15 percent of the imported drugs' prices increase to above
the reference price. Before the treatment, on average, all rms set prices between 20
percent below and 2 percent above the reference price. However, all rms increase
prices with respect to the reference price. While generic drugs are still available for 11
percent below the reference price, the average price of the brand-name drugs lies 32
percent above the reference price with a CEL. The last column of Table 3 (P<CEL)
shows that half of the generic drugs are exempt from co-payments while only six
6A table with the classication is available from the authors upon request.
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percent of brand-name drugs and no imports are exempt. To assess the magnitude
of CEL, we compare these gures to the respective shares of hypothetically exempt
drugs before the policy where we calculate hypothetical exemption levels from the
reference price data. While almost half of the generics would already have been
exempt even before the introduction of CEL, the share of exempt brand-name drugs
decreases from 14 percent to 6 percent after the introduction. Imported drugs are
not available below the CEL once they are applicable.
Table 3: Co-payment exemptions and prices (treated)
(P<RP) (p-rp)/rp P<CEL
CEL Before After Before After Before* After
Generics .97 .98 -.20 -.11 .49 .55
(.15) (.10) (.23) (.23) (.50) (.49)
Brand .91 .69 .02 .32 .14 .06
(.28) (.46) (.41) (.68) (.35) (.24)
Importer .90 .76 -.02 .20 .13 .008
(.29) (.42) (.29) (.48) (.34) (.09)
Notes: Data of the treatment group from Q1 (January 2007) to
Q15 (June 2010). Means and standard deviations (in parenthe-
ses) of pricing patterns by rm class before/after the introduction
of co-payment exemption levels (CEL). * Hypothetical exemp-
tion levels calculated based on reference prices before the actual
introduction of the CEL. Data source: FASHI. Own calculations.
4 Estimation strategy
We use quasi-hedonic regressions to analyze the eects of regulatory changes and
cost-sharing on the price-setting of rms (Sorensen, 2000; Berndt, Bir, Busch, Frank,
and Normand, 2002; Cabrales and Jimenez-Martin, 2013; Berndt, Pindyck, and
Azoulay, 2003). Traditional hedonic price functions empirically assess the relation-
ship between prices (and marginal costs) and the characteristics of dierentiated
products (Pakes, 2003). Similar to our approach, Duggan and Morton (2011) use a
price equation and rst-dierences to identify the negative eect of Medicaid pro-
curement on drug prices.
Here, the pharmaceutical industry equilibrium can be characterized as a Bertrand-
Nash outcome (Kaiser, Mendez, Rønde, and Ullrich, 2014). This means that the
hedonic price function captures the expected marginal costs plus mark-up condi-
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tional on product characteristics (Pakes, 2003). Furthermore, we explicitly model
regulation and competition (Danzon and Chao, 2000).7
We apply a dierence-in-dierences approach where we exploit the sequential in-
troduction of CELs across dierent therapeutic markets to identify causal eects.
The preferred control group discussed in detail below consists of drugs treated in
the last observed period (quarter 16). To alleviate potential endogeneity concerns
with respect to the unobserved correlations of reference prices with the error term
of the price equation, we use regulation intensity across dierent therapeutic mar-
kets as instruments for reference prices (discussed below). To address concerns on
dierences in trends in prices, we use log specications (Hackmann, Kolstad, and
Kowalski, 2015).
The price equation for drug j in time t in therapeutic market m can be written as:
ln pimt = α ln r̂pimt + βCELimt + γnmt + τt + ζi + εimt (1)
where the logarithm of the price for each drug, ln p, rst depends on the instrumented
reference price, ln r̂p, and on the co-payment exemption policy indicator, CEL. The
variable CEL is 1 from the quarter in which the co-payment exemption policy was
introduced for the respective therapeutic market, and 0 before. We include the
number of rms within the therapeutic market, n, to capture market size and as a
proxy for competition. Time dummy variables, τt, control for quarter-specic shocks
such as business cycle, seasonality, or ination. Product xed eects (αi) capture the
time-invariant drug package's characteristics (such as [unobserved] quality, package
size, side eects or ecacy), and εit are normally distributed error terms (Bajari,
Fruehwirth, Kim, and Timmins, 2012). In Equation 2, we dierentiate the eects by
rm type: gen (generic), brand (brand name), and imp (importing):
ln pimt = α ln r̂pimt + β1(geni × CELimt) + β2(brandi × CELimt) (2)
+β3(impi × CELimt) + γnimt + τt + ζi + εimt
The treatment group comprises all therapeutic markets in which the exemption
policy was introduced between April 2007 and October 2010. The control group
CELlate consists of all drugs that were treated in the last quarter. Both groups
7Estimates can be interpreted as implicit prices and we can derive evidence on the role of
regulation. However, the interpretation of the estimates as consumers' marginal utilities or as a
rm's marginal costs is dicult (Danzon and Ketcham, 2004; Danzon and Chao, 2000; Pavcnik,
2002).
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become treated over time and dier only in the timing of the introduction. A range
of descriptive and empirical tests conrm the quality of the control group. We need
to assume that the treatment decision is independent of the two groups' unobserved
characteristics.
Figure 1: Mean prices of the ve treatment quarters presented in Table 1 three quarters before
and two quarters after the introduction of a CEL. The solid line shows the mean prices of the control
group CEL late.
It is essential that pre-treatment prices show similar trends to fulll the identifying
assumption for a dierence-in-dierences approach: the treatment and the control
group must not dier in the unobserved characteristics associated with an inter-
temporal variation in prices. Figure 1 presents mean prices over time for the ve
groups of treated drugs presented in Table 1 and the control group formed by those
treated in the last quarter (Q16). The treated therapeutic markets show similar
constant pre-policy price-trends as the control group. The gure also provides rst
descriptive evidence of the policy's eect on prices. Prices decrease after the intro-
duction. Since a CEL is often accompanied by a decrease in the reference price, we
need to control for the changes in reference prices to estimate a causal eect of the
CEL. Table 9 in the Appendix presents descriptive statistics for the treatment and
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the two control groups. The treatment and the late control group (CELlate) show
very similar absolute prices and price-to-reference price ratios. As a robustness check,
we also present the results for an alternative control group of therapeutic markets
that were treated before 2007 (CELearly), where, on average, prices are higher.
We empirically test for independent price trends of the treatment and the control
group. Following Pavcnik (2002), we regress prices prior to the treatment on time
trends and on the interaction of time trends and treatment (Quarter x Treatment)
with time and product xed eects. The results in Table 4 indicate decreasing prices
over time [Quarter] and no statistical signicant dierence between the time trend
of the treatment group and the control group.
Table 4: Price trends prior to treatment
Price[ln]








Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses;
constants are not reported; * p < .05, ** p < .01,
*** p < .001; Sample includes only observations
for pre-CEL periods. Data source: FASHI.
The main identifying assumption underlying equations 1 and 2 is the exogeneity of
the CEL introduction and of the reference price [CEL|ε = 0; rp|ε = 0]. In Germany,
the FASHI implements CELs based on the legislative goal to generate savings. As
discussed above, we could not nd any pre-dened rules as to when to introduce a
CEL to which therapeutic market, which was conrmed by the decision committee
and business professionals. The implementation is an administrative decision which
can be characterized as a black box.
Nevertheless, we empirically test for drivers of the decision to introduce the policy
and estimate the likelihood to belong to the treatment group (as opposed to the
respective control group) on potential drivers of the introduction using a logistic
regression. Since the political goal of the policy is to generate savings, potential
variables of interest are reference prices, prices, and market size approximated by
the number of rms. We collapse our data at the molecule level (mean) where
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observations after the introduction are dropped.8 Table 5 shows that there is no
signicant dierence between the treatment group and the preferred control group
(CEL late) with respect to absolute prices, reference prices or competition in column
(1) and only a slight dierence to the alternative control group (CEL early) in column
(2). Compared to the early treated, the number of rms is statistically signicant
and positive for treated therapeutic markets. Thus, we control for the number of
rms in our price regressions.
Table 5: Drivers of the decision to introduce CEL
Treatment Decision: treated = 1
CEL late CEL early
Reference Price (ln) -0.068 -0.23
(1.57) (1.12)
Price [ln] 0.06 0.39
(1.59) (1.13)
# Firms 0.13 0.09∗
(0.08) (0.05)
N 103a 251b
Notes: Logistic regression with outcome variable treat-
ment (1) or no treatment (0). Observations are
dropped after rst treatment and then collapsed at the
molecule level. Treatment: drugs facing a CEL be-
tween Q2 2007 and Q3 2010, CEL_late: the preferred
control group treated in the last quarter (Oct.Dec.
2010). CEL_early: the control group treated in or
before Q1 2007. 50 treated molecules. a: 53 treated
late. b: 201 treated early * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01; Data source: FASHI.
Since we observe the same drugs over time, we expect their unobservables to be
correlated and cluster all standard errors at the product level. Due to the panel data
structure, clustered standard errors allow us to control for a potential rst-order
correlation of the error terms.
We argue that endogeneity issues cannot be severe in the German system although
reference prices and their adjustments depend on lagged competitors' prices. First,
adjustments happen irregularly (zero to two adjustments over four years) and cannot
be foreseen (on average every seven to eight quarters varying between two and 16).
Second, they are based on prices that are lagged by eight months on average (own
8The number of treated molecules is smaller here than the number of therapeutic markets in
Table 1 since the denition of a therapeutic market takes package specics such as the form of
administration within the same molecule into account. In the main regression, package xed eects
account for this.
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calculation). However, there seems to be no systematic pattern: ocial documents
show variations in lags from seven to 60 weeks before the adjustment (FASHI, 2011).
Third, prices of drugs with small market shares below 1 percent are not considered,
and fourth, at least 20 percent of all packages must be priced below the reference
price. Thus, the regulation hinders strategic price setting. Since an average of 23
rms are selling one molecule, a stable mechanism to collude in such an environment
does not seem very credible.
However, to eliminate any endogeneity concerns, we nevertheless apply a two-stage
least squares with xed eects estimation approach and replace the reference price
by its rst-stage prediction using two instrumental variables, Z. First, we use the
average reference price in all other therapeutic markets, which is correlated with
the own reference price but does not directly inuence the price. This instrument
exploits the fact that adjustments take place irregularly. How often and by how much
reference prices change and in which therapeutic markets depends on the regulator's
focus and resources. Taking into account that the resources of the health insurances
are limited, the regulatory activity in one market can indicate how much the regulator
focuses on all other markets. We expect that the regulator rst focuses on markets
with higher expenses and adjusts reference prices downwards if necessary. Since
resources are limited, we hypothesize that the change of the own reference price and
the change of the average reference price are negatively correlated.
Second, by the same rationale, we assume that the average number of products in
other therapeutic markets can serve as an indicator for the regulator's focus. The
larger a market, the more important it is that the health insurance adjusts the
reference price downwards. Thus, we expect the correlation with the own reference
price to be positive.
Finally, there is no evidence that prices are correlated with the characteristics of other
markets or the regulator's resources other than through reference prices. Thus, the
exclusion restriction Cov(Z, ε) = 0 holds.
The rst-stage results are presented in the Appendix, Table 10, with all coecients
showing the expected signs. The F-statistics of excluded instruments are 123 and
127 for the two estimations, and tests for weak instruments (Stock, Wright, and
Yogo, 2002) are above the relevant thresholds (p-value = 0.13 and 0.14). The overi-
dentication test suggested by Hansen (1982) cannot be rejected.
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5 Empirical results
Section 5.1 presents the main results of the eects of the co-payment exemption
levels on rm's pricing strategies and robustness checks for our identication strat-
egy. Section 5.2 presents and discusses the demand eects of the policy, looking at
one specic indication. In that section, we also look at one potential driver of the
heterogeneous treatment eect.
5.1 Price eects of co-payment exemptions
Our main results in Table 6, columns (1) and (2), show that rms set lower prices
on average if a CEL is in place.
While the OLS results show price reductions of 3 percent, controlling for unobserv-
ables in the two-stage least squares framework decreases the eect of the exemption
policy to 2 percent. Given that a CEL lies 30 percent below the reference price,
average price changes do not seem very large.
Expecting heterogeneous treatment eects, we dierentiate the introduction of co-
payment exemption levels by rm-type (Eq. 2) and present the results in Table
6, columns (3) and (4). In the 2SLS specication, prices for generics decrease by
6 percent indicating that generic rms respond stronger to the incentives of lower
co-payments than the other rm types. In contrast, brand-name rms increase their
prices by 5 percent on average. Our ndings indicate dierentiated pricing strategies
of pharmaceutical rms. Generic manufacturers compete in prices and, on average,
decrease them due to the new policy. The eect is driven either by inecient rms
leaving the market or by reduced mark-ups. Importers tend not to change their
pricing strategies. Their production costs are mainly the sourcing costs of originators'
drugs in other European countries which are largely exogenous to them (Ganslandt
and Maskus, 2004; Duso, Herr, and Suppliet, 2014).
Brand-name manufacturers do not participate in price competition. We are the rst
to show that the phenomenon of price increases after changes in the cost-sharing
structure. Since our results show similar eects as the generic competition para-
dox (Scherer, 1993) we refer to these ndings as the co-payment exemption para-
dox. Our results identify market segmentation where branded drugs maintain higher
prices, even with additional competition-enhancing instruments (Regan, 2008; Pavc-
nik, 2002).
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Table 6: Price eects of the co-payment exemption policy
Price [ln] (1) (2) (3) (4)
(OLS) (2SLS) (OLS) (2SLS)
Reference Price [ln] 0.21∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
CEL -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01)
CEL × generic -0.06∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
CEL × innovator 0.05∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
CEL × importer 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
# of rms [ln] -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Product FE yes yes yes yes
Quarter FE yes yes yes yes
R2adj 0.44 0.44 0.46 0.46
N 23,757 23,757 23,757 23,757
F 134.99 136.04 136.03 134.71
Notes: 2SLS: reference price instrumented with the average ref-
erence price and the average number of products in other ther-
apeutic markets. Standard errors are clustered at the package
level and presented in parentheses; constants are not reported; *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; CEL: co-payment exemption
level. Data source: FASHI.
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There are four channels identied in the literature which may explain market seg-
mentation after changes, such as generic entry, in the competition structure. First,
the literature on brand loyalty assumes exogenous segmentation of the market upon
entry where one group consists of price-sensitive patients and the other switches
to the cheapest substitute (Regan, 2008; Frank and Salkever, 1997). These models
hinge on the assumption of Stackelberg competition and specics of the demand
curve. Second, promotional activity over the drug's life cycle may explain low prices
and high advertising levels in early years and high prices and lower advertising in
later years (Bhattacharya and Vogt, 2003). Third, substitution between generic
and brand-name drugs may be imperfect from a medical point of view (Nabin, Mo-
han, Nicholas, and Sgro, 2012). Finally, health insurance coverage explains market
segmentation, which can lead to price increases of brand-name drugs (Ferrara and
Kong, 2008; Ferrara and Missios, 2012). The rst three channels do not apply to
the German market (distribution rules hinder free choice for publicly insured, which
inuences brand loyalty, and advertising is not allowed for prescription drugs). How-
ever, we show in section 5.2 that health insurance coverage indeed plays a role for
the patient's substitution behavior.
In all specications, prices decrease by 2 to 2.5 percent when reference prices decrease
by 10 percent, a number that is in line with previous research (Kaiser, Mendez,
Rønde, and Ullrich, 2014; Augurzky, Goehlmann, Gress, and Wasem, 2009; Herr,
Stuehmeier, and Wenzel, 2015).
In Table 7, we present alternative estimations. Columns (1) and (2) show that the
results hold for another control group: clusters which had been treated between
October 2006 and March 2007 (CELearly). Results change marginally in magnitude
and standard errors. Prices and reference prices are positively correlated and the
co-payment exemption policy has a negative eect on the prices of generic drugs
and a positive eect on the prices of brand-name drugs. Results of rst-dierence
regressions, which control for rst-order correlation of the error terms, in columns
(3) and (4) in Table 7, show a more intense negative price eect of co-payment
exemption levels on prices. The eect of the policy is -6 percent for generics and +4
percent for brand-name drugs in the FD-2SLS specication.
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Table 7: Robustness checks
CEL early FD (CEL late)
Price [ln] (1) (2) (3) (4)
(OLS) (2SLS) (OLS) (2SLS)
Reference Price [ln] 0.31∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
CEL × generic -0.07∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
CEL × innovator 0.04∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
CEL × importer -0.01 0.01 -0.03∗∗ -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
# of rms -0.04∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Product FE yes yes yes yes
Quarter FE yes yes yes yes
N 269,764 269,764 21,690 21,690
R2adj 0.39 0.31 0.21 0.19
F 802 797 100 100
Notes: CEL early: alternative control group treated in or be-
fore Q1 2007. FD: estimation in rst dierences with CEL late
as control group. 2SLS: reference price instrumented with the
average number of products and the average reference price in
other therapeutic markets. Standard errors are clustered at the
product level and presented in parentheses; constants are not re-
ported; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; CEL: co-payment
exemption level. Data source: FASHI.
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5.2 Demand eects of co-payment exemptions
The success of the co-payment exemption policy also depends on the substitution
behavior of patients. To address the question of how the co-payment policy trans-
lates into quantity changes, we utilize monthly data by IMS Health (Pharmascope
National) on all epileptic drugs sold to the public health insurance in Germany from
2004 to 2010 (almost 130,000 observations). This sample comprises several generic
and brand-name drugs and 22 molecules. Seven molecules are part of a reference
pricing scheme and for ve of these molecules co-payment exemption levels were in-
troduced after mid-2006. The sample is restricted to drugs that were treated at some
point during the observation period to ensure homogeneous market conditions.9 The
data contains product-level information on prices, sales, and product characteristics
over 84 months. Furthermore, it provides indicators of whether the drug was treated
by the co-payment exemption policy and on whether the rm decreased the price
below the exemption level. The data does not contain information either on reference
prices or on the co-payment exemption levels themselves. For drug i in therapeutic
market m and time t we estimate the following equation
ln qimt = θ ln ˆpimt + λ ˆexemptimt + κpolicymt + τt + ζi + εimt (3)
where the quantity for each drug, ln q, depends on the instrumented drug's price, ln p̂,
and on whether the drug is exempt from co-payments. The instrumented indicator
ˆexempt is 1 for exempt products and 0 for non-exempt products. The baseline
eect of the introduction of the co-payment policy on sales is captured by policy
which is 1 from the period onward when the policy was implemented in a specic
molecule market. As argued in section 4, the timing of the introduction is exogenous
to individual manufacturers. Time dummy variables, τt, control for quarter-specic
shocks. Product xed eects (ζi) capture constants over time (such as [unobserved]
quality, package size, side eects or ecacy), and εit are normally distributed error
terms.
Causal eects rely on instrumental variables for the two strategic rm variables: price
and exempting products from co-payments. First, product-specic cost-shifters are
approximated by Danish prices which are independent of demand shocks in Ger-
9Results hold for estimations with the full sample. The direction of estimated coecients are
the same and coecients are, on average, larger (not reported).
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many.10 Second, the rm's decision to decrease prices below co-payment exemption
levels should be driven by competition in the respective market. Therefore, we choose
the number of rms and the number of products of competitors in the same molecule
market as instrumental variables for the rm's decision. Table 8 presents OLS and
2SLS estimation results for sold quantities (daily doses) and market shares within
the molecule as dependent variables. Results throughout all specications show the
positive eects of co-payment exemptions on sold quantities. The eects are even
larger for the 2SLS specications and also hold for columns 3 and 4 where market
shares are the dependent variable. While the introduction of the policy has, on aver-
age, negative eects on sales (baseline eect), the sum of the two coecients λ and
κ is positive but small. Firms can compensate the losses of the price decreases below
the co-payment exemption level by increases in sales of 12 percent and in market
shares of about 1.5 percentage points. The results are conditional on price levels
that negatively aect sold quantities indicating downward sloping demand.
Table 8: Quantity eects in the anti-epileptic drugs market
Quantity Market Share
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Price [ln] -.399∗∗∗ -1.799∗∗∗ -.016∗∗∗ -.156∗∗∗
(.063) (.349) (.004) (.042)
With CEL = 1 -.264∗∗∗ -.764∗∗∗ -.009∗∗∗ -.086∗∗∗
(.035) (.029) (.256) (.026)
Exempt = 1 .423∗∗∗ .857∗∗ .018∗∗∗ .107∗∗
(.034) (.37) (.004) (.042)
Product FE yes yes yes yes
Period FE yes yes yes yes
N 84,184 84,184 84,184 84,184
F-test exluded ins. 25, 65 65, 82
Hansen j (p-val) .0035 0.81
Notes: 2SLS: Price and exemption status are instrumented with
Danish prices and the number of other products and rms in the
same molecule market, respectively. Standard errors are robust
and presented in parentheses; constants are not reported; * p <
0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; CEL: co-payment exemption level.
Data source: IMS Health, Pharmascope National.
Our ndings indicate that consumers switch to drugs without co-payments, control-
ling for dierences in qualities and prices. Furthermore, the results indicate that
10The prices of all authorized pharmaceutical products marketed in Denmark are publicly avail-
able at http://medicinpriser.dk/. We replace the drug price with Danish mean prices of thera-
peutically equivalent products if the same product is not available in Denmark.
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rms that do not respond to the policy by decreasing prices, e.g., brand-name rms,
face considerable losses in sales.
5.3 Spillover eects on private health insurances
Ferrara and Missios (2012) show that dierentiated insurance coverage can lead to
the generic competition paradox where the prices of brand-name drugs increase al-
though generic entry induces more price competition. In Germany, approximately
10 percent of the population are covered by private insurances and their plans are
generous regarding drug reimbursements compared to the public insurance. Fur-
thermore, privately covered patients have co-payment schemes that are dierent to
the public insureds and, as such, they are not directly aected by the introduction
of the CEL. Following Ferrara and Missios (2012), we hypothesize that the market
shares of brand-name drugs for privately insureds increase when a CEL is in place.
Since market conditions are unchanged for privately insureds, we are investigating
a spillover eect of the introduction of CEL in the public health insurance on the
privately insureds.
We use information on pharmacy sales to privately insured patients from IMS Health
(The Pharmaceutical Market in Germany). The data contain information on the
overall market shares of anti-epileptics covered by public and private health insur-
ances. We limit the data to brand-name drugs and investigate whether relatively
more privately insureds received a brand-name following the introduction of a CEL.
Figure 2 shows the percentage of brand-name drugs sold to privately insureds from
2004 to 2010 by treatment status. The brand-name share of privately insured pa-
tients in the treated and non-treated groups was roughly the same before the rst
introduction of CEL. It varies between 5 to 10 percent, which corresponds to the
share of privately insured patients in the overall population. However, the descrip-
tive evidence shows that brand-name market shares of privately insured patients
increase to around 20 percent after the introduction of the co-payment exemption
policy where the solid vertical lines indicate the introduction of the CEL in the
anti-epileptics market. Our results suggest that the policy incentivizes the publicly
insureds to choose cost-ecient drugs and brand-name rms to focus on privately
insureds (niche strategy).
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Figure 2: Market share of anti-epileptic brand-name drugs across all privately insured in Germany
from 2004 to 2010. The solid vertical lines indicate the introduction of the CEL policy in the anti-
epileptic drugs market. Data source: IMS Health, The Pharmaceutical Market in Germany.
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6 Discussion and conclusion
This paper shows that the combined introduction of the favored US-approach of
tiered co-payments and the dominant European regulation of reference pricing can
lead not only to decreasing drug prices but also to market segmentation. In par-
ticular, we analyze manufacturers' pricing strategies when health plans oer the
option of zero co-payments if drug prices lie below a pre-dened level. Our paper
exploits the institutional features of a newly introduced exemption policy in Ger-
many, its application to pharmaceuticals with reference pricing, and its successive
implementation in dierent therapeutic markets. We analyze whether the incentive
for patients to switch to lower-priced drugs impacts the pricing strategies of rms.
We utilize quarterly price data of all prescription drugs sold in Germany between
2007 and 2010 and show that the policy has a signicant negative eect of -5 percent
on generic prices (-4 to -9 percent, depending on the empirical specication) while
brand-name rms increase prices by 2 to 7 percent due to the new regulation. We
refer to these ndings as the co-payment exemption paradox since they are similar
to the price increases of brand-name drugs after generic entry, which is called the
generic competition paradox.
Additional analysis supports theoretical ndings that emphasize the correlation be-
tween changes in drug prices and dierentiated health plan coverage (Ferrara and
Missios, 2012). In Germany, 11 percent of the population are covered by private
health plans for which the analyzed co-payment rules do not apply. We exploit this
fact and nd that the share of private to public payers consuming brand-name drugs
increases in treated markets while it remains quite stable in untreated markets over
the sample period.
Furthermore, it is crucial to understand how demand-side instruments can steer
drug demand toward cost-ecient products. While reference pricing means that the
consumers of comparatively more expensive drugs have higher co-payments, the new
policy rewards lower-priced drug users with zero costs. A more detailed analysis
with product-level data from the anti-epileptics market indicates increases in sales
of about 12 percent when rms decrease their prices below the exemption level.
In a simplied back-of-the-envelope calculation that quanties the economic impact
of the policy, we multiply the overall eect of CEL (-2 percent) with the total spend-
ing of the public health insurance on prescription drugs regulated by reference pricing
of e12.14bn in 2010. The reform would have led to savings of about e242m, assum-
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ing that the reform was introduced for the rst time for all drugs simultaneously in
2010. However, analyzing the social welfare eects of the policy requires more infor-
mation on sales to quantify substitution after the policy change, data on physician
or hospital visits, and follow-up costs.
Compared to other European countries and to the US, the fraction of drug co-
payments is small in Germany (Arcidiacono, Ellickson, Landry, and Ridley, 2013;
Baicker and Goldman, 2011) and lied at e2.40 per package in 2010 (ABDA, 2016).
Hoadley, Summer, Hargrave, Cubanski, and Neuman (2012) state that in most Medi-
care Part D Prescription Drug Plans (PDP) median cost-sharing across all insureds
was only $5 for generics, but $41 for preferred brands, and $92 for non-preferred
brands in 2012. Baicker and Goldman (2011) argue that cost-sharing should be
(near) zero for drugs that both save money and improve health. The German ap-
proach of exempting very low-priced drugs can be seen as an incentive to lower prices
for manufacturers and increase consumption of preferred products. The relevance of
the policy during our observation period is supported by additional information from
the health insurances which indicates that most exempt products (12,887) were sold
in March 2010 (numbers have been increasing steadily since 2006) while the overall
number of products in the market remained constant (FASHI, 2011).
Empirical evidence shows that tiered co-payments successfully curb the overuse as-
sociated with generous health insurance coverage (Gruber, 2006). Some researchers
have raised concerns about adverse health outcomes due to higher drug expenditures
by patients (Baicker and Goldman, 2011). The approach to exempt very low-priced
drugs from co-payments would alleviate problems of high drug expenditures. The
problem of overuse is not addressed in this paper. Here, this is unlikely to be a prob-
lem since rst, we only consider prescription drugs, and second, only very low-priced
drugs are exempt from co-payments.
In the context of the optimal design of health insurance plans, cost-sharing and
premiums can be interpreted as characteristics of a two-part pricing contract (Lak-
dawalla, Sood, and Gu, 2013). Consumers face low unit prices (cost-sharing) and
transfer their consumer surplus (premiums) to insurers. Under the assumption that
the benets and costs of consumption are equal at the margin, insurances must pro-
vide goods and services at marginal costs (Lakdawalla and Sood, 2013). We show
the eectiveness of the CEL policy to eliminate margins above marginal costs from
treated drugs.
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The price eects of the CEL policy indicate some price elasticity of demand in the
German drug market. We may underestimate the negative eect of co-payment ex-
emption levels due to private information about preferred-supplier contracts between
health insurances and generic producers (Blankart and Stargardt, 2016). Sometimes,
insurers oer their insureds the option of co-payment exemptions or 50 percent re-
ductions for selected rebated drugs (ABDA, 2016). Not considering these rebates
on list prices, our estimates for the eect on generics can be interpreted as lower
bounds. Brand-name drugs do not take part in these rebate negotiations. Since the
list prices for these drugs correspond to the true prices we do not overestimate the
positive branded drug eect.
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Appendix
Table 9: Descriptive statistics of treatment and control groups
Sample Price Price<RP Price<CEL CEL (1=yes) N
mean mean mean mean
(std) (std) (std) (std)
Treatment 32 .92 .41 .73 18,829
(47) (.26) (.49) (.45)
Control: CEL late 29 .93 . . 6,032
(23) (.25)
Control: CEL early 55 .96 .53 1 252,039
(133) (.19) (.49) (0)
All 45 .94 .51 .76 373,056
(115) (.22) (.49) (.42)
Notes: Statistics of the treatment group and the two control groups from Q1 (Jan.
March 2007) to Q15 (JuneSept. 2010). Treatment: drugs facing a CEL introduction
after January 2007 and before October 2010, CELlate: the preferred control group treated
in the last quarter (Oct.Dec. 2010). CELearly: the control group treated in or before
January 2007. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses). Prices and reference
prices are ination adjusted to the base year 2007. Data source: FASHI. Own calculations.
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CEL × generic -0.18∗∗∗
(0.01)
CEL × innovative -0.10∗∗∗
(0.02)
CEL × importer -0.10∗∗∗
(0.02)
# of rms (ln) 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗
(<0.01) (<0.01)
RP other markets -0.49∗∗∗ -0.49∗∗∗
(0.03) ( (0.03)
# of products (other) 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(<0.01) (<0.01)
Product FE Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes
N 23,757 23,757
R2adj 0.62 0.63
F test excluded inst. 123 127
Hansen j (p-val) 0.13 0.14
Notes: First stages of the 2SLS estimations in Equa-
tions (1) and (2). Second stages presented in Table
6, columns 2 and 4. Standard errors are clustered at
the product level and in parentheses; * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; CEL: co-payment exemption
level. Data source: FASHI.
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